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This paper analyses the role fulfilment of Chinese people’s congress deputies in the
reform era. It argues the role fulfilments have changed in the 1990s. First, Chinese leg-
islators have conducted three roles, i.e., supervision, reflection, and policy-providing,
and regarded the first two as their dominant roles. This implies that deputies act main-
ly as public supervisors and reflectors rather than “regime agents.” Second, deputies’
role fulfilments have differentiated depending on their social backgrounds. Deputies
from worker and peasant backgrounds tend to act as reflectors and supervisors, while
deputies with intellectual backgrounds and some official deputies are more orientated to
policy-providing. Private entrepreneurs and businesspersons who become deputies are
more interested in exemplary leadership and economic roles, the closest role of “regime
agents.” Finally, the power from below — deputies and the public — will be the main
force in the Chinese legislative development, and resultantly Chinese legislatures will
be more representative than now.
INTRODUCTION
The members of a legislative body in every country are required to fulfill
representation roles on behalf of their constituents in the spheres of policy-
making, budget-allocating, and service-providing (i.e., errand-running). The
deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and local people’s con-
gress at various levels in China, who numbered over 3.5 million in 1994 and
3.23 million in 1998, are no exception. At least, according to the Chinese
Constitution, as “people’s deputies,” they should champion the public’s
interests. However, in the 1980s, Chinese citizens regarded people’s con-
gresses as “rubber stamps” and frequently considered the members as
“deputies in name only.” Western scholars were also critical of the deputies’
roles fulfillment. For instance, McCormick argued that all deputies whom
he had interviewed in the late 1980s and early 1990s did not want to become
deputies.1 In this case, deputies could not be expected to faithfully carry out
their roles. O’Brien, differing with McCormick, did not find that all deputies
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1 McCormick (1996: 40). 
were inactive. Instead, he argued that even active deputies behaved chiefly
as regime agents, and that they were best thought of as remonstrators rather
than representatives.2
What changes have there been in the Chinese legislators’ role fulfillment
in the 1990s? What roles do deputies now perform, and to what degree? In
this regard, first, it is worth emphasizing that both the NPC and local peo-
ple’s congresses have become important political actors in the reform era,
especially in the 1990s.3 This hints at the possibility of change in deputies’
roles fulfillment, because legislative functions could not have strengthened
without legislative members themselves being more active. In addition,
available evidence notes the change in public attitude toward deputy status.
For example, a 1993 survey conducted in Shuzhu city of Hunan showed that
about 26 percent of respondents earnestly wanted to be deputies, even
though 40 percent of them still did not want to be deputies (the rest said
they would serve if elected).4 Also, more and more influential regional fig-
ures, including entrepreneurs and leading cadres in government and state-
sponsored organizations, have asked legislative leaders to help them to
become deputies since the mid-1990s.5 In particular, the “Guangdong
Phenomena” in 2000 and “Shenyang Incident” in 2001 could not have
occurred without changes in the deputies’ roles fulfillment, which were
caused by their active participation. 
This article will argue that the roles fulfillment of the people’s congress
deputies have changed since the early 1990s. First, legislators have conduct-
ed three roles, i.e., supervision, reflection and policy-providing, with the
first two as their dominant roles. That is, they perform primarily as public
supervisors and reflectors rather than as regime agents. Second, deputies’
roles fulfillment has differed depending on their social backgrounds.
Legislative members from worker and peasant backgrounds tend to act as
reflectors and supervisors, while legislators with intellectual backgrounds
and some official deputies are more oriented to policy-providing. Private
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people’s congresses, see Lin (1992-93); O’Brien (1994b); Xia (1997; 2000); O’Brien and
Luehrmann (1998); MacFarguhr (1998); Chen (1999); Cho (2002; 2003).
4 Li Jitai, “We Should Pay Attention to Voters’ Supervision of Deputy’s Role Fulfillment,”
Bulletin of the Works of People’s Congresses (Renda gongzuo tongxun, hereafter RGT) 8 (April
1994): 30. 
5 Interviews with the leaders and senior staff of local people’s congresses: Tianjin, March 21
and 22, 2001; “The Status of Deputy is Not an Amulet,” News of China’s People’s Congresses
(Zhongguo renda xinwen, hereafter ZRX), September 18, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.
com.cn.
entrepreneurs and businesspersons who become deputies are more interest-
ed in exemplary leadership and economic roles, the closest role of regime
agents. In sum, deputies since the early 1990s have progressively become
more representative than before, even without the radical change of the
Chinese party-state and its legislative system.
This article will concentrate on the roles of active deputies in order to
understand the kinds of role they perform and the degree of their perfor-
mance. Chinese legislators can be placed somewhere along a continuum: at
one end are those who play a minimal role (i.e., only attending annual ple-
nary sessions and other significant events), and at the other are deputies
who spend most of their time on legislative duties. The former can be con-
sidered inactive. In contrast, active deputies participate in various activities,
and they illustrate the kinds and degrees of deputies’ roles fulfillment.6
Thus, we need to focus on active deputies. To this end, I investigated
deputies who were featured in journals published by the NPC and provin-
cial-level people’s congresses.7 I have also conducted interviews with some
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6 Currently we cannot exactly estimate the proportion of inactive and active deputies due to
the lack of available statistics. According to some data gathered by Chinese researchers, active
deputies are, of course, less numerous than inactive ones. For example, in a survey of deputies
to the Yangzhou City People’s Congress conducted in January 1999, about 31 percent of
respondents regarded themselves as “deputies who performed roles well,” while about 65
percent replied “generally acted” and 4 percent said that they “did not play any role.” About
26 percent of deputies did not participate in any legislative activities when the people’s con-
gress was not in sessions. In the case of Yangzhou city, at best about 30 percent of deputies
can be considered as active, and the same rate holds for inactive deputies who only attend the
plenary sessions and important events (the rest are placed between the extremes). Li Jitai and
Zhang Yuanyuan, “Deputy Works in Deputies’ Eyes,” People’s Congress Forum (Renda luntan)
8 (August 1999): 28. However, according to several surveys, now both deputies and the public
think that their roles have been markedly strengthened in the 1990s. Cheng Chuanwei and Fei
Wenqun, “What Are Deputies from Basic-levels in the Municipality Concerned About?”
Shanghai People’s Congresses Monthly (Shanghai renda yekan) 3 (March 2000): 18-20;
“People’s Congresses in the Mind of Common People,” Masters of Times (Shidai zhuren) 11
(November 2000): 26-27; “Citizens in Guangzhou City Generally Identified with the Proposals
of People’s Congress Deputies,” Southern City Daily (Nanfang dushi bao), March 29, 2001. On
the deputies’ roles fulfillment in the mid-1980s, see Zhao (1990: 87-112, 185-196, 217-241).
7 Now all the 31 provincial-level people’s congresses publish their journals monthly, and
every issue carries about two or three articles on deputies’ activities. Of these, I investigated
10 journals that are published by relatively active congresses, and I covered the period from
the January 1999 to June 2001 (30 issues per journal). The journals are: Shanghai People’s
Congresses Monthly; People’s Voices (Renmin zhi sheng) in Guangdong; People’s Political Forum
(Renmin zhengtan) in Fujian; Rule of Law (Fazhi) in Heilongjiang; People and Power (Renmin yu
quanli) in Jiangsu; Works of People’s Congresses in Shandong (Shandong renda gongzuo); Masters
in Hubei (Chutian zhuren); People’s Friend (Renmin zhi you) in Hunan; Master of Times in
Jiangxi; Construction of Local People’s Congresses (Difang renda jianshe) in Hebei. I also investi-
gated the deputies featured in the NPC’s semi-monthly journals, i.e., RGT and Chinese People’s
legislative leaders, staff and deputies to complement the documentary sur-
veys. 
Finally, analysing the deputies’ roles fulfillment, this article will not dis-
tinguish among the deputies according to their administrative levels for two
reasons. First, the deputies to township- (xiangji) and county-level (xianji)
people’s congresses comprise about 97 percent of all deputies, as Table 1
indicates. The activities of deputies to the NPC and provincial-level people’s
congresses do not have substantial meaning due to their small size. Second,
there are few differences between the NPC and county-level people’s con-
gress deputies in terms of practical activities when the congresses are not in
sessions. In a sense, the lower the administrative level of the deputies, the
more active were their roles  fulfillment. 
CHANGES OF LEGAL & POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND PUBLIC
EXPECTATIONS TOWARDS DEPUTIES
Legal and political conditions for the activities of legislatures and the
public expectations towards legislative members have important influences
on the roles people’s congresses deputies play, and the degree of their per-
formance. Legal and political conditions and the public’s cognition have
gradually, but markedly improved since the early 1990s. Under these more
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Congresses (Zhongguo renda, hereafter ZR], from 1994 to the present. Finally, I analyzed the
most active 100 deputies who were recommended by people’s congresses at the request of
NPC staff. Quanguo renda (2000). In total, I analysed some 600 cases that I could confirm both
deputies’ social backgrounds and roles fulfillment.
TABLE 1. NUMBER OF PEOPLE’S CONGRESS DEPUTIES AT VARIOUS LEVELS (november 1,
1994)
Divisions (number of people’s congresses) Deputies (%)
NPC 2,979 (0.1)
Provincial levels (30) 20,989 (0.6)
Cities divided into districts (189) and 
83,155 (2.8)
People’s congresses autonomous prefectures (30)
County-level (2,897) 651,311 (18.6)
Township-level (48,172) 2,743,378 (78.3)
Total 3,501,811 (100.0)
Source: Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting lianluoju, “Our Country has over 3.5 Million
People’s Congress Deputies at Various Levels,” RGT 1 (January 1995): 320.
conducive conditions, Chinese legislators have become more courageous
and active in carrying out their roles.
First of all, legal conditions for deputies’ activities have improved since
1992. Neither legislatures nor their members took root in the 1980s, and they
frequently encountered difficulties in accomplishing their duties. Party and
government cadres frequently infringed upon the deputies’ powers, and
work unit leaders in many cases did not allow legislators enough time to
carry out their duties. In consequence, deputies asked legislative leaders to
enact a specific law to clearly prescribe their duties and powers.8 As a result,
the NPC enacted the Law of Deputies to the NPC and Local People’s
Congresses at Various Levels in 1992.9
This law provides deputies with such guarantees as immunity from
arrest. Further, according to this law, state institutions, social organizations
and the public should cooperate with deputies to aid them in accomplishing
their functions. In addition, work units should provide legislators with com-
pensation for time and income foregone while performing legislative duties.
After the law became effective, incidents of deputies’ powers being
infringed upon have decreased, and their powers have been better protect-
ed.  The law’s promulgation marks a “new phase” in deputies’ work.10
There were, of course, continuous infringements of people’s congress
deputies’ powers in the 1990s. In Hunan alone from 1992 to 1996, 97 cases of
violations of the Deputy Law were reported.11 However, there are striking
differences in the consequences before and after the law’s enactment. That
is, infringements have been punished after the legislation of the Deputy
Law. In those cases, both the Party and legislatures generally directly partic-
ipate in the investigations, and publicize the results in an attempt to warn
other cadres.12
In China, political guarantees for people’s congress deputies granted by
the Party are more critical than legal guarantees. In this regard, Chinese leg-
islators have been able to enjoy markedly improved activity conditions
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9 Liu (1999: 281-283).
10 Anhuisheng renda, “The Achievements are Remarkable, but the Burden is Heavy and the
Road is Long,” ZR 1 (January 2000): 14; Interviews with leaders and senior staff of local peo-
ple’s congresses: Tianjin, March 21 and 22, 2001.
11 Anhuisheng renda, “The Achievements are Remarkable,” 14.
12 On concrete cases, see Hebeisheng renda changweihui, “A Circular on the Case of Zhang
Fusheng Deputy’s Illegal Detention by the Fengfeng District Court,” ZR 1 (January 2000): 23;
“A Hunan People’s Congress Deputy was Assaulted and the Assaulting Officer was Finally
Punished,” People’s Daily (Renmin ribao), September 5, 2001, ZRX, September 5, 2001,
http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn.
since the early 1990s. The Party has taken steps to strengthen the role of the
people’s congresses and their members. After the 1986-87 student move-
ments and 1989’s Tiananmen Incident, the Party center decided to strength-
en the supervisory function of all state organs as well as the Party itself, in
order to control cadre corruption and to restore public confidence. A deci-
sion issued by the CCP Central Committee in 1990 was a good example.13
Support of people’s congresses in wielding their supervisory powers
according to the law was an important component of the Party’s policy.
Since committing itself to the formation of a socialist market economy in
1992, the Party has stressed governance according to the law (yifazhiguo).
This policy, which was adopted as a guiding principle at the 15th Party
Congress in 1997 and recorded in the Preamble of Constitution through a
1999 amendment, also invigorated legislative members, since people’s con-
gresses are state power organs with the rights to legislate and to supervise
the implementation of laws by other state organs.14
To implement this policy, the provincial Party committees held work con-
ferences on legislatures across the country throughout the 1990s.15 The
Tianjin Municipal Party Committee, for example, in an unprecedented act,
held it in July 1994, and it emphasized two points: the Party committees
should put legislative works on their agenda and fully support legislatures
and their members to exercise their powers in accordance with laws; and
legislatures should improve their works by sticking to the Party line.16 After
this conference, 18 district and county Party committees in Tianjin area con-
tinued to hold similar meetings to implement this, and these measures
brought “new winds” to legislative works.17
Finally, increased public expectations have encouraged people’s congress
deputies to play more active roles. In the 1990s, residents more frequently
visited their deputies when they encountered difficulties. According to Shi’s
survey of the urban population in Beijing in 1988 and 1996, the percentage
of the public who complained through deputies increased from 8.6 to 14.1
percent.18 Similarly, the volume of public letters and visits (xinfang) to legis-
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13 “A Decision of the CCP Center on Strengthening the Link between the Party and
Masses,” Zhonggong zhongyang (1991: 935).
14 Interviews with leaders and senior staff of local people’s congresses: Tianjin, March 21
and 22, 2001.
15 Li Bojun, “The Situation of People’s Congress Work Conferences Held by Provincial Party
Committees,” ZR 3 (February 2000): 19-20.
16 Tianjinshi (1997: 482-483).
17 Interviews with senior staff of Tianjin Municipal People’s Congress: Tianjin, April 2, 2001;
Kang (1999: 4).
18 Shi (1999: 155). A poll in the Far Eastern Economic Review in late 1994 found a similar
latures sharply increased. Beginning in the mid-1990s, letters and visits in
Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Congress increased by 50 percent annually,
and several county-level people’s congresses in Guangxi recorded increases
of 20-40 percent in the same period.19 Consequently, legislatures, along with
the Party and governments, became one of the main channels for the public
to complain about social problems. As people say, “visit deputies when you
have sticky problems.”20
In line with these greater expectations, the public also wants to supervise
deputies more strictly. Legislative members who do not appear to fulfill
their duties face the prospect of being dismissed from office. Residents in
one electorate of Guangxi’s Nanning city, for instance, held a meeting in
March 2001 and dismissed a deputy who they believed did not carry out the
role earnestly.21 In response to public demands, legislative leaders also
began to suspend the qualifications of ordinary legislators who are absent
from plenary sessions twice without prior approval according to the Deputy
Law. The county people’s congresses of Anxiang in Hunan, Linqu in
Shandong, and Pengshan in Sichuan all suspended deputies’ qualifications
in February 2001.22 In addition, legislative members have to report their role
achievements to voters and face evaluations in voter meetings.23 From 1994
to 1996, in Chenzhou city of Hunan, for example, about 6,500 deputies at
various levels reported their accomplishments and were appraised accord-
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result. When asked whom they approach to lodge a complaint, 22 percent of respondents said
deputies, an increase from 13 percent in 1988 (Pei, 1998: 75).
19 Chen Xin, “Standardizing People’s Congress Standing Committee’s Works of Letters and
Visiting,” Rule of Law 1 (January 2001): 12; Tan Rifei, “If You Have Something Doing, You Will
Have a Status, Otherwise You Won’t,” People’s Congresses in Guangxi (Guangxi renda) 4 (April
1999): 5.
20 Li Zhanggen, Zhang Jihua, “Why Have Shuchuan County People’s Congress’s Works of
Letters and Visiting Increased More and More?” Masters of Times 4 (April 2000): 28.
21 “Yongxin District of Nanning City in Guangxi: A Deputy’s Qualification Suspended for
Not Fulfilling Deputy’s Duty,” People’s Daily, May 23, 2001, ZRX , May 23, 2001,
http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn. For other cases, see “Incompetent Deputies Should be
Dismissed”, People’s Daily, September 19, 2001, ZRX, September 19, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peo-
pledaily.com.cn.
22 “Anxing in Hunan and Linqu in Shandong Had a Deputy’s Qualification Suspended for
Not Attending People’s Congress Plenary Sessions without Reason,” People’s Daily, May 23,
2001, ZRX, May 23, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn; “Pengshan County in Sichuan
Suspended the Qualification of a County People’s Congress Deputy,” People’s Daily, April 11,
2001, ZRX, April 10, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn.
23 Some regions started to use it in 1988, and more and more regions have adopted it since
the early 1990s.  Gan He, “Contemporary New Progresses in the Works of People’s Congress
Deputies and a Few Problems That Need Study,” Study of People’s Congresses (Renda yanjiu) 9
(September 2001), http://www.rdyj.com.cn.
ing to this system.24
Legislative leaders have not just asked deputies to play their roles more
actively, however. They have also attempted to motivate legislators by
adopting new measures for overseeing other state organs since the early
1990s, including the examination of law enforcement (zhifa jiancha) and
deputies’ appraisals of state organ works (daibiao pingyi). These measures
have given deputies an expanded and more effective scope of activity than
in the 1980s.25 For instance, when people’s congresses in Henan conducted
an examination in 1992 to assess whether government had implemented
agriculture-related laws and central policies properly, some 70,000 members
from 77 percent of county-level and 91 percent of township-level people’s
congresses in the province participated in this examination.26 Annually
about 70,000 legislators at various levels in Sichuan also engaged in
deputies’ appraisals of public security systems (1996), procuracies (1997)
and courts (1998).27
Under these improved conditions, people’s congress deputies have begun
to more actively wield their power. The “Guangdong Phenomena,” a series
of incidents brought about by the deputies of Guangdong Provincial
People’s Congress in 2000, is one example. It began with an interpellation
bill (zhixun’an) introduced by some deputies at the plenary sessions held in
January, which required the Environmental Protection Bureau of the
Provincial Government to explain why it did not suspend factories that
caused serious water pollution. Dissatisfied with the replies from the
Bureau’s vice-director at hearing meetings, the deputies prepared to submit
a personnel motion to discharge the vice-director, and asked to meet a vice-
governor responsible for environmental affairs. Eventually, the Governor
accepted all the requests from the deputies, and later changed the vice-
director in order to lessen the deputies’ anger, although classifying it as a
“regular personnel shift.”28 A month later, the Standing Committee of
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24 Anhuisheng renda, “The Achievements are Remarkable,” 14. On other cases,  see Huang
Daming, “Reported Duty Fulfillment Towards Voters and Let Voters Appraise,” Shanghai
People’s Congress Monthly 2 (February 2000): 12-14; Chen Zhangyu, “A Report on the Self-
Reporting of Wang Zengchang,” People’s Political Forum 8 (August 2001): 28; Zheng Guofeng,
“Deputies to People’s Congresses Go on Self-Reporting Platforms,” People’s Political Forum 8
(August 2001): 38-39.
25 On examination and appraisal, see Cho (2002: 734-739). 
26 Quanguo renda (1995: 239).
27 Cui Jianhua, “The Flowers of Appraisal Evolved in the Sichuan Area (1) (2),” Construction
of Democracy and Legal System (Minzhu fazhi jianshe) 8 (August 1999): 8-10 and 9 (September
1999): 9-11; “In Order Not to Tilt the Scales,” Construction of Democracy and Legal System 10
(October 1999): 11-13.
Guangdong People’s Congress did not ratify two of ten nominees for the
director posts of government bureaus recommended by the Governor. Zhu
Selin, the Chairman of the Standing Committee, was quoted as saying,
“Nominees who did not get a majority of votes could not be passed. It was
the result of the members’ use of democratic power, and nothing was more
normal than this.”29
The “Shenyang Incident,” which is said to be “a first in Chinese constitu-
tional history,” and “a remarkable incident in Chinese democratic poli-
tics,”30 occurred under similar circumstances. The Municipal People’s
Congress deputies did not approve an annual work report of the
Intermediate People’s Court in the plenary sessions held in February 2001.31
The Party considers the annual work reports of government, court and
procuracy in advance, and deputies review these reports at the plenary ses-
sions with the Party’s principle agreement. In addition, before and during
sessions, the Party leaders convene temporary Party meetings that Party
members-cum-deputies attend, and leaders ask deputies to toe the Party
line. Thus, the deputies’ assertive veto of the work report surprised the pub-
lic as well as state leaders across the country. Even before the Shenyang
Incident, the Gonghe County People’s Congress in Qinghai refused to pass a
court annual work report in April 2000. However, because it happened at
the county-level, the public did not pay much attention to it, while
Shenyang, the provincial capital of Liaoning, is vice-provincial-level.32
CHANGED DEPUTIES’ ROLES FULFILLMENT IN THE 1990S
Under the improved legal and political conditions for legislative activities
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28 Ren Tianyang, “The Whole Story on Guangdong People’s Congress Deputies Addressed
Inquiries to the Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau,” Study of People’s Congresses 4
(April 2000), http://www.rdyj.com.cn; “Supervision: Make ‘Amiable together’ Get out of,”
Masters of Times 12 (September 2000): 7-9.
29 “Guangdong People’s Congress Vetoed Two Directors’ Appointments Asked by the
Governor,” Chinese Youth Daily (Zhongguo qingnianbao), February 23, 2000, ZRX, February
23, 2000, http://www.peopledaily.com.cn. On other incidents, see Wu Xi, “Guangdong
Phenomenon in the Works of People’s Congresses,” People and Power 10 (October 2000): 39.
30 “Overcoming the Confidence Crisis by Use of Judiciary Justice,” Legal Daily (Fazhi ribao),
August 10, 2001, ZRX, August 10, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn.
31 “From Veto to Approval: Shenyang People’s Congress Considered Twice a Court Work
Report,” ZRX, August 10, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn; “From Not Passing to
Passing with a Wide Majority: Regaining Public Confidence,” Legal Daily, August 10, 2001,
ZRX, August 10, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn.
32 “Shenyang Incident Caused Serious Legal Problems,” Chinese Youth Daily, August 11,
2001, ZRX, August 13, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn.
and higher public expectations since the early 1990s, people’s congress
deputies have conducted three major roles: supervision, reflection (fanying)
and policy-providing. These roles differ from those in the 1980s. 
Supervision
People’s congress deputies pay much more attention to the supervisory
role since they now regard it as their most important daily duty.33 As noted
before, since the early 1990s, the Party and legislative leaders have stressed
this role as an effective tool for controlling cadre corruption in local govern-
ments. They also emphasize this role because deputies can help the Party
center to alleviate poor implementation of central policies in the local com-
munities. In this regard, people’s congresses have two advantages: they
have a huge supervisory corps of more than 3 million deputies, and they
can wield their supervisory authority in the name of the people. 
Generally speaking, legislative members try to supervise the policy
implementation of mid- and basic-level state organs, concentrating on such
key issues as the “three arbitraries” (sanluan, or arbitrary fines, fees and
apportionment) of government bureaus and the abuse of power by public
security bodies. Meanwhile people’s congresses’ plenary sessions and their
standing committee meetings, in accordance with the Constitution and per-
tinent laws, tend to concentrate on overseeing macro-issues, including the
overall achievements of state organs, and the drafting and execution of state
budgets and socio-economic development plans.
Legislators can conduct supervisory roles both collectively and individu-
ally. Since most regions have adopted new supervisory measures since the
early 1990s, most deputies have been able to carry out these activities collec-
tively under the leadership of people’s congresses standing committees. For
instance, when the Nankai District People’s Congress in Tianjin conducted a
deputies’ appraisal for six months in 2000, 85.6 percent of members partic-
ipated in inspections, meeting with residents and listening to their
opinions.34 Similarly, about 90 percent of deputies to the Hongkou District
People’s Congress in Shanghai have attended deputies’ appraisals for sever-
al months every year since 1995.35 In addition, deputies engage in supervi-
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33 Interviews with leaders and senior staff of people’s congresses: Tianjin, October 26, 2001
and January 10, 2002. 
34 “The First New Attempt: Sidelights on the Appraisal Meeting of Law Enforcement in
Nankai District,” Works of Tianjin People’s Congresses (Tianjin renda gongzuo) 12 (December
2000): 8, 17.
35 Zhou Kecheng, “Make Deputies Play a Master Role in Appraisal Activity,” Shanghai
People’s Congresses Monthly 8 (August 1999): 31-32.
sion through deputy small groups (daibiao xiaozu). Since the late 1980s, they
have had to belong to a region- or trade-based group of this kind. In Beijing,
17,498 people’s congress deputies at all levels were organized into 1,734
small groups in 1997: three groups for the NPC deputies, 36 for the Beijing
Municipal People’s Congress, 471 for county-level and 1,224 for township-
level people’s congresses.36 In Tianjin, 77.3 percent of Municipal People’s
Congress deputies took part in 13 groups based on their trades such as eco-
nomic, financial, education, and urban construction.37 These groups decide
and conduct supervisory activities, such as addressing problems of law
enforcement by jointly visiting chiefs of public security and Party leaders.38
People’s congress deputies also individually visit law enforcement
departments, meet leading officials and demand the resolution of problems.
If they directly observe cases of illegal law enforcement, legislative members
can protest by showing their identification cards. Furthermore, some
deputies concurrently serve as special supervisors of courts, procuracies
and government law enforcement bureaus at the request of these institu-
tions. Currently about 12 percent of Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress
deputies act as special supervisors of this kind.39 Further, local courts in
many regions, under a direction of the Supreme People’s Court in 1998,
have begun to establish a special office that is specifically responsible for
executing deputies’ suggestions.40
Legislative members occasionally encounter difficulties in conducting
their duties, such as assault and arrest. They even risk death while earnestly
conducting supervision.41 There is another problem of relevance here: the
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36 Beijingshi renda changweihui daibiao lianluoshi, “Research on the Works of People’s
Congress Deputy Small Groups,” RGT 8 (April 1997): 20.
37 Yang (1997: 51). On the activity of deputy small group, see Tianjinshi Dagangqu dijiu
daibiaozu, “Arrange Connections Well, Collect All Efforts Well, and Display the Role of
Deputy Small Group,” RGT 18 (September 1996): 31; Hezheshi Nancheng renda lianluochu,
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(April 1994): 24-26.
38 On concrete cases, see Quanguo renda (2000: 270-278); “Their Minds are Closely Focused
on the Masses,” Shanghai People’s Congresses Monthly 8 (August 1999): 34-36; “For the
Happiness of People,” Works of People’s Congresses in Shandong 6 (June 2000): 38-39.
39 Hai Yan, “Hu Zhengchang Explains the New Year’s Thinking of Deputy Works,”
Shanghai People’s Congresses Monthly 2 (February 1999): 4-5. For other cases, see, “Repair the
House Before It Rains, Take Preventative Measures,” Works of People’s Congresses in Shandong 5
(May 1999): 61-62.
40 “Xiao Yang Required Courts at Various Levels to Actively Accept People’s Congress
Supervision,” Works of People’s Congresses in Shandong 3 (March 1999): 61; “Henan Province
Dengzhou City Court Established a Liaison Office for People’s Congress Supervision Works,”
ZRX, May 17, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn.
41 On concrete cases, see “Clear as Ice and Pure as Gem, Concerned with the People’s
supervisory effect. One report on the examination of law enforcement in
Anhui in the mid-1990s found that executive branches faithfully corrected
only about 30 percent of the problems that people’s congresses had raised.42
This indicates that the supervisory effect was not ideal. However, some evi-
dence supports the claim that the supervisory effect has improved since the
early 1990s. 
First, in addition to the Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress case dis-
cussed above, deputies in other regions have also resolutely wielded strong
powers like interpellation when state organs refused to accept their
demands. For example, legislative members of Hunan, Sichuan, Henan, and
Hainan Provincial People’s Congresses submitted interpellation bills in
1998, 1999 and 2000.43 Furthermore, leading officials, judges and procura-
tors are dismissed after supervision. In 2000 alone, people’s congresses in
Huaihua city of Hunan discharged 6 leading cadres: 1 county vice-magis-
trate, 3 judges and 2 procurators.44
Second, the implementation rate (luoshilü) of people’s congress deputies’
proposals, through which legislative members express demands on supervi-
sion and other matters, has increased. In the case of Shanghai Municipal
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TABLE 2. IMPLEMENTATION OF DEPUTY PROPOSALS: SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL PEOPLE’S
CONGRESS
8th (1983-87) 9th (1988-92) 10th (1993-95) Subtotal
Implemented or Cases 1,666 3,245 1,228 6,139
implementing Rate (%) 33.4 48 50.7 43.3
Scheduled to Cases 734 1,110 429 2,273
implement Rate (%) 14.8 16.4 17.7 16.1
Conference Cases 753 1,192 636 2,583
for work Rate (%) 15.1 17.6 26.3 18.2
Explained to Cases 1,831 1,214 128 3,173
deputies Rate (%) 36.7 18 5.3 22.4
Total 4,984 6,761 2,421 14,166
Source: Cai (1998: 370).
Minds,” RGT 5 (March 1996): 35-36; Quanguo renda (2000: 212-220).
42 Quanguo renda (1997: 119, 123).
43 Chu Yang, “Members Angrily Introduced an Interpellation Bill,” People’s Friend 3-4 (April
1999): 20-22; “Deputies to Sichuan People’s Congress Required Social Welfare Bureau to
Explain,” People’s Friend 3-4 (April 1999): 55; Wang Caiwei, “Open and Clear Sky: Records on
Several Interpellation Cases,” People’s Political Forum 6 (June 2001): 10-13. 
44 “Strict and Impartial Laws Advance Rule of Law,” People’s Daily, April 4, 2001, ZRX,
April 4, 2001, http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn. 
People’s Congress, as Table 2 shows, the rate of “implemented or imple-
menting” increased from 33.4 percent in the 8th period (1983-87) to 50.7 per-
cent in the 10th period (1993-95) of the Congress. Similarly, a staff member
responsible for deputy liaison work of the Xiangtan City People’s Congress
in Hunan noted that the rate increased from less than 20 percent in the mid-
1980s to 48.5 percent in 1999.45 Further, legislatures turn down government
work reports relating to the implementation of deputies’ proposals when
government, they believe, did not sincerely consider their demands. In
November 1999, for instance, the Standing Committee of Chongqing
Municipal People’s Congress vetoed a work report on the implementation
of proposals, because about 40 percent of deputies were dissatisfied with
the government’s handling of their proposals.46 In these ways, legislative
members have forced other state organs to implement their demands more
sincerely, and the supervisory effect has been enhanced.
Reflection (fanying)
People’s congress deputies are required to maintain contact with the pub-
lic in order to understand social problems and listen to public demands. At
the same time, legislators should transmit public demands to state organs,
and urge these organs to carry them out faithfully. This role, a component of
the bridge-building (qiaoliang) roles of deputies, has been regarded as a very
important duty of deputies since the early 1980s. Party leaders emphasize
this role, not only because it provides the regime with a trustworthy channel
to understand social problems, but also because it enhances social integrity
by alleviating public dissatisfaction before an explosion. A case in point is
Jiang Zemin’s remarks that deputies should maintain contact with the pub-
lic more earnestly, and more actively reflect public demands.47 Public
demands reflected by deputies have exerted more and more influential
effects on government in the 1990s, as shown by the increased implementa-
tion rate of deputies’ proposals.
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Recently, people’s congresses regularly collect and make public the statistics of the implemen-
tation rate, and the leadership of other state organs are very nervous about the results. This is
because the Party committees and people’s congresses think that a government’s low rate of
implementation shows the government’s “arrogant” attitude toward “people’s voices.” Other
state organs try to raise the rate as high as possible, and as a result, the satisfaction of deputies
is elevated. Interview with a leader of local people’s congress: Tianjin, October 26, 2001.
46 Yun Wanbang, “Two Small Stories, One Big Essay,” ZR 16 (August 2000): 33-34.
47 Jiang Zemin, “On Holding Firmly and Developing the People’s Congress System,” 624-
625.
Legislative members reflect various demands affecting people’s daily
lives. Repairing roads and bridges, improving public facilities (e.g., public
toilets, street lamps and water supplies), alleviating environmental pollu-
tion, providing better educational and medical services, and preserving
public order are most frequently reflected issues in both urban and rural
areas. In the countryside, as a county-level people’s congress deputy stated,
legislators make special effort to highlight the lack of funds for agricultural
construction and the heavy burden on farmers.48 Some deputies have
attained honourable titles such as “road deputy” or “control pollution
deputy” for their achievements in these areas.49 Deputies also listen to resi-
dents’ personal problems. They try to find jobs for the unemployed, to
resolve disputes between residents, and to raise funds for poor students.
Many deputies are affectionately known as “meddlers” (aiguan xianshi)
because they are willing to interfere in public matters if so requested.50
When reflecting demands, people’s congress deputies frequently do so
collectively. Legislative members have often used the method of jointly sub-
mitting bills (yian) and proposals (jianyi). When the demand needs the
approval and support of a higher-level government, it is submitted with the
help of that congress’s deputies. For instance, several deputies to the NPC,
the Heilongjiang Provincial and the Hailun City People’s Congresses, who
were all elected in Hailun in Heilongjiang, submitted a joint proposal to the
Provincial People’s Congress, and not to the city’s congress in 1993. The pro-
posal urged a Harbin city-owned company to redeem about 3.5 million
RMB (yuan) to farmers who lived in the city. Finally, with the strong support
of the Provincial People’s Congress and Government, deputies could
resolve the problem.51
Frequently, legislative members individually reflect public demands to
the Party and government leaders. Since the early 1990s, the Party and gov-
ernment have established special systems to allow deputies to directly
transmit public demands to the leadership. For instance, a deputy of the
Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress was able to address a serious pira-
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48 Zhen Yongfu, “If You Clearly Know Something, Do It Immediately: An Account in a
Basic-Level Deputy’s Own Words,” People’s Political Forum 7 (July 2001): 22-23.
49 Gu Jilin, “Several Stories on Road Deputy,” People and Power 7 (July 2001): 19-20; Quanguo
renda (2000: 35-37).
50 Zhang Zaihua, “Old Man Who Likes to Meddle,” People’s Friend 9 (September 2000): 20-
21; Wu Tanchun, “Feeling No Qualms Upon People’s Great Trust,” People’s Friend 12
(December 2000): 12-13; Miu Yichun, “Old Meddler Lai Suping,” Masters of Times 2 (February
2000): 40-41.
51 Ma Tianmin, “A Good Deputy in the Mind of Pingan Villagers,” Rule of Law 5 (May 2000):
14-15.
cy issue in his region by using the “deputy hot line” (zhitong kuaiche), which
was established in 1998 by Li Changchun, the Party secretary of
Guangdong.52 Deputies can also use meetings with top leaders during the
plenary sessions of people’s congresses or other meetings. An NPC deputy
of Jilin, for example, actively appealed to several leaders of the State
Council and Jilin Provincial Government about the economic difficulties of
her county during the 1994 NPC plenary sessions in Beijing. Eventually the
governor of Jilin province promised to lessen the money that the county
government was required to remit to higher-level governments.53 Deputies
in other regions also frequently use these channels to reflect the public’s
demands.54
Policy-Providing
Until recently, even the supreme state power organ in China (i.e., the
NPC) played a minimal role in decision-making for important policies. For
instance, although granted by the Constitution and other pertinent laws,
only since 1998 has the NPC Standing Committee reviewed the issue of
emergency national loans requested by the State Council, but without any
substantial changes of the original proposals. Before then, the NPC in many
cases did not have the opportunity to review important policies: among 57
major national infrastructure projects spending more than one billion RMB
(yuan) in the 7th (1986-1990) Five-Year Plan, none were submitted and con-
sidered at the NPC meetings.55 Similarly, the NPC ordinary deputies play a
very limited role in decision-making processes inside the legislature. Only
four bills, among 3,667 in total submitted by the NPC deputies over 10 years
from 1983 to 1993, were put on the agenda of NPC meetings, and only one
of them was passed with a resolution.56
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Role,” RGT 23 (December 1994): 16-18; Li Guiju, “How I Fulfill the Duty of Deputy to People’s
Congress,” RGT 5 (March 1995): 19-20.
54 For other cases, see Neimongu zizhiqu renda gongwei bangongshi, “Body Burdened with
Deputy’s Responsibility, Mind Concerned with People’s Voices,” RGT 21 (November 1995):
34-35; Xu Xuefeng, “Deputy’s Speech was Effective,” RGT 5 (March 1995): 22; Xiong Jisheng,
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Politics,” RGT 15 (August 1995): 33-34.
55 Wang (1993: 253-258). Of course, the NPC reviewed one important issue in 1992: a bill on
the Three Gorges dam project introduced by the State Council. However it was a special case,
brought about by the coincidence of some deputies’ strong requests and government attempts
to lessen its burden. See Huang (1997: 121-263); Zhu Guanglei (1997: 157-165). 
Local people’s congress deputies have played a more prominent role than
the NPC deputies in this area, and their roles have been gradually but clear-
ly strengthened since the early 1990s. However they function mainly as pol-
icy-”providers,” not policy-”makers.” Policy-providing means that legisla-
tive members provide governments with policy proposals on important
matters, and that they can sometimes make governments implement their
proposals by means of decisions and resolutions which have the same legal
effect as local laws in a given region. This role is similar to the role of policy
representation in liberal democracies. Deputies performed some roles in this
area even in the late 1980s, by collecting information and consulting the
Party and government on policy implementation. They also acted as opin-
ion leaders in planning for lawmaking by submitting bills and proposals to
people’s congresses.57 Still they were not able to directly affect the decision-
making of important policies. It is at this point that deputies have started to
break through since the early 1990s.
For example, according to Table 3, almost all deputies to Wuxi City
People’s Congress participated in submitting bills in the 1990s. The legisla-
tive leaders more actively put the deputy bills on the agenda of legislative
meetings: of 306 bills submitted by the deputies over 16 years, 27 bills (8.7
percent) were considered in the meetings and passed with resolutions and
decisions.58 As a result, Wuxi City Government had to implement them,
although some of them needed a large amount of funding and time, as
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56 Quanguo renda (1990: 855-857); “Summary on the Result of Consideration of Deputy’s
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57 On specific cases, see Compilation group (1989: 41-50, 139-141, 183-193).
58 Lu Jiebial, “Enlightened Project,” People and Power 8 (August 1999): 23.
TABLE 3. PEOPLE’S CONGRESS DEPUTY BILLS: WUXI CITY PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, JIANGSU
Years Deputies Bills Deputies participated 
(1)/(2)
(periods) registered (1) submitted (persons/time) (2)
1993 (11th) 596 18 786 1.3:1
1994 (11th) 596 20 846 1.42:1
1995 (11th) 596 12 439 0.74:1
1996 (11th) 596 21 847 1.42:1
1997 (11th) 596 15 1,052 1.77:1
1998 (12th) 418 20 809 1.94:1
1999 (12th) 418 13 553 1.3:1
Source: Lu Jiebiao, “Enlightened Projects: Wuxi City Respects Deputy’s Power to Submit Bills, and
Achievement Made the Public Happy and Focus on It,” People and Power 8 (August 1999): 22.
shown in Table 4. Other regions show the same trend, although there are
disparities between regions. Deputies’ bills in the Guangdong Provincial
People’s Congress, for example, made the government initiate projects in
areas like water control, and the construction of electrical facilities, roads
and housing in the 1990s.59
Propaganda and Exemplary Leadership Roles
People’s congress deputies, as regime agents, are required to propagate
laws and policies, and to persuade the public to observe them on behalf of
state. They have conducted this role since the early 1980s. However, in the
1990s, first, legislative members did not seem to spend much time and effort
in carrying out this role. Strictly speaking, as a legislative leader stated, this
is the role of government officials, not deputies.60 For this role, deputies
generally try to transmit the decisions that are discussed and passed at the
plenary sessions of people’s congresses to the electorate. They also explain
laws and policies when the populace requests this, and sometimes more
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TABLE 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF DEPUTY BILLS: WUXI CITY PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, JIANGSU
Deputies Period & funds
Year Title of bill
participated (RMB, yuan)
3 years
1995 Strengthening the construction of food basket project 184
50 million
8 years
1996 Firmly controlling water pollution of Tai Lake in Wuxi area 351
305 million
5-8 years
1998 Accelerating the cleaning of river sediments in the region 189
740 million
Source: Lu Jiebiao, “Enlightened Projects,” pp. 22-23.
59 “People Are Happy, Land Is Splendid: A Retrospect of the Provincial People’s Congress
Standing Committee’s Considering and Implementing Deputy Bills,” People’s Voices 11
(November 1999):13-14. Legislative leaders select deputy bills very strictly, because bills have
a legal effect in a given region if they are passed with decisions or resolutions. Thus, they
should get the prior approval of the local Party committees before putting bills on the agenda,
and should also consult local governments in advance. For this reason, deputy bills are not
easy to be put on the agenda. However recently, more and more deputy bills are considered
in legislative meetings. For example, in 2001, Xuhui and Jiabei People’s Congresses in
Shanghai adopted four out of eight deputy bills and three out of seven, respectively. “Deputy
Bills of District and County People’s Congresses in Shanghai were not Day-to-day Accounts,”
Shanghai Youth Daily (Shanghai qingnianbao), March 8, 2001, ZRX, March 8, 2001,
http://zgrdxw.peopledaily.com.cn.
60 Interview, Tianjin, October 26, 2001.
actively persuade them to observe the laws and policies. Second, the content
of propaganda has also changed since the late 1990s. Deputies pay more
attention to publicizing the system of people’s congresses itself instead of
laws and policies. This is partly because the NPC and the Party center
decided to strengthen the propaganda of people’s congresses in December
1998.61
The exemplary leadership role is similar. Deputies, especially those who
come from basic-levels, are required to lead the public in carrying out state
policies such as economic development. In practice, they actually do this.
Most peasant deputies to a county-level people’s congress, for example,
based on the government’s policy of agricultural restructuring, became the
first to cultivate economic crops to persuade other farmers to do likewise.
Deputies from private business backgrounds also took the lead in paying
taxes honestly and cleaning up the environment.62 Since many deputies,
especially those at the basic-level, are role models in their fields before
becoming deputies, this role is not new to them. They perform this duty by
continuing in their own occupations as model workers and farmers. It has
thus become a far less prominent deputy role than supervision and reflec-
tion, even though legislative leaders and members pay lip service to it to
sop the Party’s supreme policy of economic development.63
DIFFERENTIATION OF DEPUTIES’ ROLES FULFILLMENT IN THE 1990S 
People’s congress deputies come from all major social classes. As Table 5
shows, workers & peasants, intellectuals, and cadres make up 70 to 90 per-
cent of deputies (the rest come from the military, returned overseas Chinese
and minority groups).64 The Party center and the NPC Standing Committee
decide this composition rate before upcoming elections, and the provincial
Party and people’s congresses apply the rate to their regions.65 Thus the rate
does not differ much from province to province even with variations
between regions and periods.
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Works of People’s Congress,” Yunnan People’s Congresses (Yunnan renda) 5 (May 1999): 7-9.
62 Wan Shuming, “Electing Her a Deputy was Not Wrong,” Masters of Times 4 (April 2001):
31; Huang Hongji, Chen Xianyong, “A Special Writing on Deputy Ye,” People’s Friend 1-2
(February 2001): 33-34.
63 Interview with leaders and senior staff of local people’s congresses: Tianjin, October 26,
2001.
64 On the statistics of people’s congress deputies, see Zhi, Shi and Zhou (2001).
65 On the decision of deputy composition rate, see, Quanguo renda (1990: 185); Quanguo
renda (1992: 171-178).
According to the theory of legislator-constituent relationships in China,
people’s congress deputies should represent the interests of both the entire
legislature and their constituents.66 Deputies in the 1980s seemed to think
this way. A survey conducted in Beijing and Hangzhou in 1987 showed that
about 50 percent of deputies thought that they should represent their voters’
interest, while a little less than 50 percent said that they should serve the
national interest.67 However, Chinese legislators in the 1990s seemed to pay
more attention to representing the partial and local interests of their social
classes and regions. That is, most legislative members tend to consider
themselves as “deputy for farmers,” “deputy for workers,” “deputy for pri-
vate businessmen” or “deputy for women.” Even official deputies (gaun-
yuan daibiao) regard themselves as representatives for particular areas, such
as public security, traffic or courts.68 This implies that deputies’ roles fulfill-
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TABLE 5. PEOPLE’S CONGRESS DEPUTY COMPOSITION: THE NPC, TIANJIN MUNICIPAL
AND NANKAI DISTRICT PEOPLE’S CONGRESSES IN TIANJIN IN THE PERIOD OF
1993 TO 1997#
NPC* Tianjin** Nankai***
2978 (percent) 718 (percent) 265 (percent)
Worker & peasant 612 (20.6) 209 (29.1) 122 (46)
Social class Intellectual 649 (21.8) 136 (18.9) 67 (25.3)
Cadre 842 (28.3) 169 (23.5) 46 (17.4)
Party CCP 2,037 (68.4) 500 (69.6) 195 (73.6)




Others Average age (years) 53.13 53.1 49
Re-election (percent) 28.05**** 35.1 N.A.
#In this table, “Social classes” does not include the military, ethnic groups, and returned overseas
Chinese because of their small size compared with other categories. “Intellectuals” refers to acade-
mics, researchers in state-run institutes, engineers, doctors and lawyers. “Cadre” mainly refers to
senior government officials and the Party leaders.
Sources: *Cai (1998: 227-228); **Tianjinshi (1997: 434-435); ***Kang (1999: 273); ****Guangming Daily
(Guangming ribao), March 1, 1998.
66 Cai (1998: 189-191).
67 Zhao (1990: 180).
68 On the cases of worker and peasant deputies, see Quanguo renda (2000: 145-55, 415-17).
For private businessmen, see Hang Hongqing, “The Days after Being a Deputy,” People’s
Friend 1-2 (February 2001): 31. For cadre deputy cases, see Wang Xiugui, Yue Guoxing, Ruan
ment have become differentiated in terms of which roles they pay more
attention to, mainly depending on their social backgrounds.
Workers and Peasants: Reflectors and Supervisors
In general, worker and peasant deputies are most active in reflection and
supervision roles. In contrast, few, if any, of these deputies play a prominent
role in the policy-providing area. There are, of course, exceptions. A deputy
to the NPC and the Zejiang Provincial People’s Congress for 15 years, and
an accountant of a villagers’ committee received the honourable title of a
“bill champion” (yian guanjun) for 4 consecutive years, from 1993 to 1997, by
submitting 61 bills and 157 proposals to the NPC in that period. She was
very proud to have subscribed to more than 20 periodicals and academic
journals such as Legal Science and Administration and Law at her own
expense.69 Most deputies from worker or peasant backgrounds have not
been as active as she has been in the policy-providing sphere.
These deputies seem to concentrate on reflection and supervision roles for
two reasons. First, these roles do not require much academic achievement
and political resources, only enthusiasm for visiting the public and listening
to their demands, and sometimes the courage to stand up to authorities.
Most deputies reported they knew little about the legal status, powers and
duties of the deputy when they were elected, not to mention how to func-
tion as deputies. After personal study and attending people’s congresses’
training classes for new deputies, they managed to acquire the basic legal
knowledge. A deputy to the Fuan City People’s Congress in Fujian and
director of a villagers’ committee is one example. He became a role model
for legislators with the nickname “full-time deputy” (zhuanzhi daibiao)
because of his enthusiastic deputy role fulfillment, even though he was
newly elected in 1997.70 As such, deputies can play these roles successfully
if they are willing to do so.
Second, but no less important, the close relationship between deputies
and voters forces them to focus on these roles. For worker or peasant
deputies, local relationships come first, and that of deputy-to-voter second,
because most of them have lived in their communities for a long time before
becoming legislative members. In addition, most of these legislators belong
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69 Quanguo renda (2000: 15-20).
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to township- and county-level people’s congresses, and are directly elected
by their neighbours. In this situation, if neighbours-cum-voters ask them to
do something for the public, they cannot easily refuse, especially when the
neighbours ask them after exhausting all other available means. In contrast,
the deputies of the NPC and provincial-level people’s congresses who are
elected by the deputies of one-level below legislatures have a lesser sense of
responsibility for residents, because they have no direct relationship with
the voters.71 In short, neighbours’ requests and close relationships with
them encourage worker and peasant deputies to concentrate on reflection
and supervision.
Intellectuals: Policy-Providers
Intellectual deputies of people’s congresses have an advantage: special-
ized knowledge and the capacity to use it. They make full use of these
advantages in performing their roles. There are many bill champions among
intellectual deputies. Four legislators who won the honour of bill champi-
ons at the 2000 Shijiazhuang Municipal People’s Congress plenary sessions
in Hebei were all intellectuals (three academics and a senior engineer).72
Also, a senior researcher and deputy to the Hunan Provincial People’s
Congress for 13 years took pride in having 39 research notebooks and sub-
mitting 975 bills and proposals in total to the congress.73
When carrying out the policy-providing role, intellectual deputies tend to
concentrate on their areas of research and work specialty. Traditional
Chinese medicine doctors continuously proposed policy bills on the devel-
opment of oriental medicine, and other doctors championed medical poli-
cies closely related with their jobs.74 Intellectual legislative members are also
interested in such areas as education, environment and juvenile delinquen-
cy.75 In addition, they sometimes mobilize their fellow experts to select poli-
cy items and conduct joint research, as a doctor in Shanghai and NPC
deputy demonstrates. He has organized a “bill think tank” (yian naoku) com-
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posed of professors, doctors, lawyers, researchers and entrepreneurs in
Shanghai, with whom he has prepared policy bills. As a result, he has been
able to introduce several legislative bills of high quality.76
Compared with deputies from other classes, intellectual legislators appear
to devote themselves to deputy roles due to a strong political consciousness.
There are many cases of intellectual deputies, especially academics, who
were sometimes willing to face political risks for deputy roles fulfillment.
Wu Qing, an English professor at Beijing Foreign Language University and
deputy to the Haidian District and Beijing Municipal People’s Congresses
for 16 years, is one of them. She originated a weekly reception day for resi-
dents the day after the 1984 elections, even though she was originally able
to be a deputy by the Party arrangement. Armed with a copy of the
Constitution and her deputy’s ID card, she has always fought against
authorities to protect the public’s rights. She was also one of the prime
movers who introduced an interpellation bill against the Beijing Higher
People’s Court during the 2000 Beijing Municipal People’s Congress plenary
sessions.77 Feng Youwei, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Sciences
and deputy to the Shenyang Municipal People’s Congress is also well
known. He is called “the first deputy of Shengyang” for his resolute and
courageous criticism of the works of government and courts, even in front
of leaders. In fact, he was at the center of the above-mentioned Shenyang
Incident. He has severely criticized the problems of the court since the 2000
plenary sessions, and has won broad support and sympathy from ordinary
citizens and fellow deputies.78
Cadres: Policy-Providers for Supplementation
Official deputies form an important component of people’s congresses,
but they are considered to be less active than any other deputies due to role
conflict. That is, as officials, they are responsible for implementing laws and
policies, while, as legislative members, they supervise the implementation.
Thus, official deputies are placed in a dilemma and many prefer to remain
inactive.79 For this reason, Chinese researchers and legislative leaders have
called for the reduction of the quota of official deputies, and the NPC and
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the Party center have also asked local authorities to reduce the quota.80
Until now, these deputies have occupied more than 20 percent of the total
(see Table 5). In some areas, their size has been over 50 percent: in 1998, the
rate was 55.94 percent in the Putuo District People’s Congress in Shanghai.81
Due to role conflict, official deputies pay more attention to policy provid-
ing than supervision, and policies are generally closely related to their
work. A deputy-cum-director of agriculture continuously submitted policy
bills on agricultural issues, and a military deputy attempted to submit mili-
tary-related bills and proposals.82 Official deputies from a particular region
frequently submitted joint bills and proposals that urged higher-level gov-
ernment to consider their regions in issues such as financial support, eco-
nomic development plans and major construction projects.83
Some official-cum-deputies, of course, supervise fellow officials and supe-
riors. A director of a county government education bureau and deputy to
the county people’s congress, for instance, successfully led an interpellation
bill in 1999 that required the urban construction bureau to remove an illegal
building near a school.84 A director of the industrial and commercial bureau
of a city government and the city people’s congress deputy also resolutely
introduced an interpellation bill in 2000 against the city court in an attempt
to protect state assets.85 Even in these cases, however, official deputies
wielded their power against other bureaus or state organs mainly to help
their own bureaus’ work. Most official deputies hesitate to use this weapon
for fear of “offending people” (dezuiren).
Why do leading cadres want to be people’s congress deputies? Apart
from the fact that being elected deputies prove officials’ credibility with the
public, and that deputy status gives them the opportunity to develop per-
sonal networks with regional leaderships, the role can actually help them to
do their own jobs.86 For example, when official deputies submit policy pro-
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posals to other government bureaus or state organs using administrative
channels, they can only ask and wait for a reply. In contrast, when they pro-
pose the same measures through legislative channels by bills or proposals
with fellow members, other bureaus and organs cannot easily ignore them,
because in this case it is the business of the legislature, and not that of a gov-
ernmental bureau. At least, they will explain why they could not accept the
policy in writing via people’s congress standing committees. Also, officials
can sometimes accomplish their goals by using weapons such as interpella-
tion. In addition, officials-cum-deputies can voice the demands of their
bureaus or organs when legislatures hear and review related matters. Or
they can have a chance to skilfully defend their positions during legislative
supervision of their bureaus or organs. With the rise of Chinese legislatures’
status in the 1990s, these opportunities become more and more important
resources in protecting and furthering organizational interests. 
Similarly, directors of residents’ committees in urban areas or villagers’
committees in rural areas, and leaders of social organizations (e.g., trade
unions and the women’s federations) also want to be elected deputies and
prefer to raise problems through legislative channels. For example, when a
residents’ committee director asked the district government for financial
support to repair sewerage systems, he only got a reply: “Your committee
should try to find a solution itself.” When he raised the same matter at a
people’s congress plenary session as a legislative member, district govern-
ment leaders were willing to accept his request.87 A trade union leader used
a similar tactic to enforce the Labour Law and to address illegal labour prac-
tices at foreign-affiliated companies. That is, when he raised the problem as
a trade union leader, the companies would not accept his requests.
However, when he argued as a legislative member, the companies changed
their attitude, and he achieved his goals relatively easily.88
Private Entrepreneurs and Businesspersons: Exemplary Leaders
Of all social classes, private entrepreneurs (siying qiyezhu) and busi-
nesspersons (getihu) seem to aspire to become people’s congress deputies
the most, perhaps in order to make up for their weak and unstable political
status. As legislators, they can meet the Party and government leaders by
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88 Quanguo renda (2000: 384-387). For this reason, social organizations that have their quota
in people’s congresses try to actively participate in congressional activities of lawmaking and
supervision. Interviews with staff of Tianjin Communist Youth League, Tianjin, May 15, 2001;
interviews with staff of Shanxi Women’s Federation, Tianjin, July 2, 2001.
attending people’s congress plenary sessions and other events, which can
help them to develop a valuable resource, guanxi ties. The status of deputy
can also function as an “amulet” (hushenfu) when they are forced to face
arbitrary law enforcement officials and stand in court.89 According to a sur-
vey on private entrepreneurs conducted nationwide by China’s Academy of
Social Sciences in 1999 and 2000, entrepreneurs think of being legislative
members as the most preferable political measure to enhance their social
status, although they much prefer to employ socio-economic measures like
maximizing business size, participating in public projects and establishing a
good image to this end.90
In practice, with the rapid expansion of the private economic sector in the
1990s and accompanying entrepreneurs’ efforts to secure their political sta-
tus, these deputies have increased in number in many regions, although we
cannot exactly estimate the number due to the lack of available statistics.
For example, only 1 percent of deputies to the Haidian and Dongcheng
District People’s Congresses in Beijing came from private business in 1987.91
In contrast, currently 23.5 percent of deputies to Taizhou City People’s
Congress in Jiangsu and about 30 percent of deputies to the Jinghai County
People’s Congress in Tianjin are private entrepreneurs.92 There are regional
disparities originating from the development of private economy and the
attitudes of the Party leaders toward the raising of entrepreneurs’ political
status. For instance, of all deputies to the Huaihua City People’s Congress in
Hunan in 1998, only 2 percent were private entrepreneurs and businessper-
sons, while people involved in private businesses in the region occupied
about 8 percent of the total population.93
Legislators from the private sector, differing from deputies from other
classes, pay much more attention to propagation of state policies and exem-
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plary leadership roles (i.e., regime agent roles). They frequently become the
first to carry out government policies such as cleaning up marketplaces and
paying taxes honestly. They sometimes enthusiastically help to persuade fel-
low businesspeople to observe government policies. As business spokesper-
sons, they also try to protect and to further corporate interests, sometimes to
the detriment of their own businesses. In these cases, it is relatively easy to
get government support because of their exemplary leadership role.94 In this
respect, these deputies are the closest to the agents/remonstrators type of
deputies which O’Brien describes.95
In addition, deputies-cum-entrepreneurs tend to contribute a share of
their income to public projects like building schools and cultural centers,
repairing roads and bridges, and helping poor students and the needy. They
take pride in their contributions to the socio-economic development of their
communities.96 In fact, they contribute to the community even before
becoming legislative members in an attempt to improve their social status
and image, and they often seem to be elected as deputies for their generous
behaviour as well as their success in business. Nonetheless, they regard
these duties as important to their functioning as deputies.
Finally, these deputies actively participate in economic-related activities
both individually and jointly. One example is the Deputies’ Friendly Society
for Economic Development of the Taihe City People’s Congress,
Heilongjiang, which deputies-cum-leaders of economic development estab-
lished in 1995. It has been praised for its prominent role in regional econom-
ic development by disseminating experience, and economic and technologi-
222 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
94 Wan  Shuming, “Electing Her a Deputy was Not Wrong,”  31; Huang Hongji, “A Special
Writing on Deputy Ye,” 33-34; Hang Hongqing, “The Days after Being a Deputy,” 31; Su
Zhangmiao, “Gleaming Footsteps,” People’s Voices 5 (May 2000): 30-31; Zhan Desheng,
“Master’s Feelings,” Rule of Law 5 (May 2000): 10-11; Fan Chuchu, “Firmly Remembering
Sacred Duty, Wholeheartedly Served for People,” Construction of Local People’s Congresses 7
(July 1999): 35-36.
95 O’Brien (1994a; 373).
96 Sun Shan, “The Speeches and Behaviors of Zhuang Jincheng,” People’s Political Forum 20
(January 2001): 20; Jia Xueyang, “The New Story of an Experienced Deputy,” Construction of
Local People’s Congresses 11 (November 2000): 19-20; Zheng Zichang, “How I Became a Deputy
to the People’s Congress,” Works of People’s Congresses in Shandong 9 (September 1999): 49-50;
Da Jia, “An Entrepreneur Deputy’s Pursuit,” Rule of Law 10 (October 2000): 10-11; Chen
Jianshi, “Honor, Responsibility and Duty,” Rule of Law 7 (July 2000): 14-15; Xiao Yan, “Scrupu-
lously Esteemed Virtue and Offered Life as a Tribute,” People’s Voices 6 (June 2001): 36-37, 40.
97 Zheng Chunqiao, “The Union of Deputy Activity and Economic Construction Promoted
Region’s Economic Development,” Rule of Law 8 (August 1999): 19; Shi Jinhua, “A Friendly
Society for Developing Economy of Deputies to Taihe City People’s Congress,” Rule of Law 7
(July 2001): 6.
cal information, by attracting foreign investment and by helping poor peas-
ants make money. It started with 9 members from the Jiazihe District
People’s Congress in 1995 and rose to 156 deputies across the city in 2001.97
A deputy small group in Didao district of Jixi city, Heilongjiang, composed
of 10 entrepreneur deputies to provincial, city and district people’s con-
gresses, conducted similar activities.98
CONCLUSION
Even now ordinary deputies of people’s congresses cannot control the
legislative system, much as Chinese legislatures per se cannot control the
polity in a Chinese party-state. Most deputies, as amateurs and sometimes
role models in their fields, suffer from the lack of time, information, and
material resources necessary for active participation in legislative works. In
particular, legislators from peasant backgrounds, who comprise the majority
of deputies in basic-level people’s congresses, are said to be passive and
incapable of fulfilling their roles due to insufficient political consciousness
and poor education. This recently came to light when government leaders in
some rural areas used bribery to get elected to higher positions at the ple-
nary sessions.99 In contrast, many official deputies, even when equipped
with various political resources and capacities, are unwilling to perform
their deputy duties because of role conflict. Legislative members cannot eas-
ily overcome these problems without fundamental political and legislative
reforms.
Chinese legislators, however, have moved closer to the center of the leg-
islative system since the early 1990s, and have become more representative
than before, even without the radical change of a Chinese party-state and
legislative system. They have conducted supervision, reflection and policy-
providing roles rather than the regime agent role or the exemplary leader-
ship role in the improved legal and political conditions. Role differentiation
between deputies has also occurred depending on their social backgrounds.
Worker and peasant deputies pay more attention to reflection and supervi-
sion, while intellectual legislators and some cadre deputies tend to focus on
the policy-providing role. Deputies-cum-entrepreneurs are more likely to
concentrate on exemplary leadership and economic related roles. 
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What implications do the deputies’ changing role fulfillment have for the
Chinese political process? For the Party center, legislative members have
become important assistants to supervise inadequate policy implementation
by local governments and the corruption of mid- and low-level officials. For
legislatures, ordinary members, together with legislative leaders and staff,
have joined the powers of improving legislative status and performance by
shielding the resistance of governments and squeezing support from the
Party in the name of people. Finally, for the populace, deputies have become
an important channel for expressing public demands and complaints, and
are sometimes more effective than the Party and government. In this sense,
the Party, legislatures and the public all benefit from the changes in
deputies’ roles fulfillment.
Finally, these changes are significant with regard to the prospects for leg-
islative development in China. The main forces in the development of peo-
ple’s congresses have historically come from above. The present Chinese
legislatures are unimaginable without the efforts of legislative leaders like
Peng Zhen and the support of the Party center. Legislative and Party leaders
promoted the development of people’s congresses because it was beneficial
for both the Party and legislatures.  It strengthened the power base of leg-
islative leaders and supported the Party’s reform policy by lawmaking and
supervision. As a result, the legislative development in China, as O’Brien
and Tanner noted, showed an interesting characteristic: i.e., institutionalised
influence without or with little liberalization.100 However, in the future,
power from below-deputies and the public-will be the primary force in the
development of people’s congresses, and as a result, Chinese legislatures
will be more representative or liberalized than they are now. The last
decade’s roles fulfillment of Chinese legislators highlight the potential for
further development of people’s congresses in that direction.
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